

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 BAMA KO 1568

E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AMGT PFOR ML
SUBJECT: PARM - ANNUAL POLICY AND RESOURCE ASSESSMENT - MALI -
PART I

REF: CERP 0001; STATE 038356

PART I - POLICY ASSESSMENTS

A. U.S. INTERESTS

1. APART FROM OUR CLASSIC DESIRE TO HAVE NORMAL
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ALL STATES WISHING TO UNDER-
TAKE THEM WITH US, I SEE LONG-TERM U.S. INTERESTS IN
MALI AS BASICALLY TWO: FIRST, TO ASSIST THIS COUNTRY
TO REMAIN NON-ALIGNED THROUGH AN APPROPRIATE MODERATING
AMERICAN PRESENCE; AND SECOND, TO HELP IMPROVE THE
QUALITY OF LIFE OF ONE OF THE POOREST OF THE WORLD'S POOR
THROUGH THE PROVISION OF A FAIR SHARE OF DEVELOPMENT AID.

2. BOTH INTERESTS ACCORD WITH STATED U.S. GLOBAL AND
REGIONAL INTERESTS IN PROMOTING PEACE AND STABILITY IN
AFRICA AND IN ACCELERATING THE TRANSFER OF RESOURCES TO
THE LESSER DEVELOPED NATIONS.

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B. OVERVIEW

3. MALI'S MILITARY GOVERNMENT IS PRAGMATIC AND
IS CONCERNED PRIMARILY WITH THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
OF A NATION HARD-HIT BY DROUGHT BUT RECOVERING IN ITS
AREAS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE, AGRICULTURE AND

LIVESTOCK. IT WELCOMES ECONOMIC AID FROM ALL SIDES AND COOPERATES WELL WITH THOSE WHO EXTEND IT, PROVIDED MALIAN DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES ARE RESPECTED. MALI INCREASINGLY RECOGNIZES THAT ONLY THE WEST AND CERTAIN OPEC COUNTRIES HAVE THE MEANS AND ARE WILLING TO FURNISH THE MASSIVE SUMS REQUIRED TO MAKE THE SAHEL COME ALIVE AND GROW.

4. IN FOREIGN POLICY, MALI PROCLAIMS ITSELF NON-ALIGNED, AND FROM ITS PERSPECTIVE IT IS. IT IS NOT AMONG THE MODERATES OF THE MOVEMENT, HOWEVER, AND ITS POSITIONS ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES ARE ALMOST ALWAYS AT VARIANCE WITH OUR. MALI'S RHETORIC HAS RECENTLY SUBSIDED AND AT THE UNESCO CONFERENCE IN NOVEMBER 1976 IT ACTED WITH RESTRAINT ON SOME ISSUES. NEVERTHELESS, ITS IMPLIED READINESS TO TAKE A MORE GENUINELY NEUTRAL STAND IN THE UNITED NATIONS HAS STILL TO BE TESTED.

5. ALTHOUGH HELD AT ARM'S LENGTH AND BY NO MEANS ABLE TO TELL MALI WHAT TO DO, FRANCE REMAINS THE SINGLE MOST INFLUENTIAL FOREIGN POWER HERE, PUTTING IN ABOUT \$75 MILLION ANNUALLY IN PROJECT AID AND BUDGET, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, AND MONETARY SUPPORT AND HOLDING THE EDGE IN THE CULTURAL DOMAIN.

6. THE SOVIET UNION COMES NEXT, MAINLY BECAUSE OF MALI'S ALMOST TOTAL DEPENDENCE ON THE USSR FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE, BRINGING WITH IT LARGE NUMBERS OF MILITARY ADVISERS. SOVIET INFLUENCE IS NOT SO GREAT AS MANY NEIGHBORING
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STATES FEAR, HOWEVER, AND THERE ARE SLIGHT INDICATIONS OF MALIAN DISSATISFACTION AT THE PAUCITY OF SOVIET DEVELOPMENT AID AND OF SOVIET DISSATISFACTION WITH MALIAN RESPONSIVENESS. IN ANY EVENT, MALI IS INDEPENDENT IN ITS THINKING. IT PERMITTED THE USSR TO USE ITS AIRFIELDS AS STAGING AREAS ALTERNATIVE TO GUINEA AND GUINEA-BISSAU IN THE ANGOLAN AIRLIFT NOT BECAUSE OF ITS INDEBTEDNESS TO THE SOVIET UNION OR BECAUSE IT WISHED TO ACCOMMODATE THE SOVIETS, BUT BECAUSE IT CONSIDERED MILITARY ACTION THE ONLY WAY TO "LIBERATE" ANGOLA. MALI SEES NOTHING UNFORTHWARD IN THE SOVIET UNION'S CURRENT ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA AND EXPECTS SOVEREIGN STATES TO HOLD THEIR OWN AGAINST ANY UNWANTED OUTSIDE INFLUENCE. DESPITE MALI'S QUEST FOR SOVIET ARMS, I DO NOT THINK IT HAS AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS AGAINST ITS NEIGHBORS.

7. THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IS ACTIVE BUT IT DOES NOT HAVE THE WHEREWITHAL TO COMPETE SERIOUSLY WITH THE SOVIET UNION. ITS ECONOMIC AID IS GIVEN MOST DISCREETLY AND IS GREATLY APPRECIATED BY THE MALIANS, HOWEVER, AND THE

PRG REMAINS A WORTHY COUNTERVAILING INFLUENCE TO THE USSR.

8. THE CUBANS AND NORTH KOREANS ARE ALSO PRESENT, THE CUBANS ACHIEVING A VERY GOOD PUBLIC IMAGE WITH THE MALIANS DESPITE THE SMALL SIZE OF THE MISSION.

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9. WESTERN DONORS, PRINCIPALLY FRANCE, CANADA, WEST GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES, AND THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONS (IBRD, UNDP, EEC) ARE ALL MOUNTING SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS WHICH SERVE TO PROMOTE MALI'S GROWTH AND TO OFFSET COMMUNIST AND OTHER RADICAL INFLUENCES. SAUDI ARABIAN AID IS ALSO HELPFUL IN THIS REGARD.

10. MALI IS A STRONG SUPPORTER OF AFRICAN UNITY AND OF CONTINENTAL AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO THAT END, SUCH AS OAU, CEAO, ECOWAS, AND CILSS. ITS CONCERN FOR THE CONTINUED VIABILITY OF THE MOVES, OF WHICH MAURITANIA IS A MEMBER, IS A PRIME FACTOR IN ITS EFFORT TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE WESTERN SAHARA DISPUTE.

11. MALI IS DEEPLY COMMITTED TO MAJORITY RULE AND INDEPENDENCE FOR NAMIBIA AND RHODESIA, MAJORITY RULE AND THE END OF APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA, AND A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER. IT IS ASSUREDLY ONE OF THE AFRICAN NATIONS WHOSE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES WILL BE HEAVILY COLORED BY OUR ATTITUDES AND ACTIONS CONCERNING SOUTHERN AFRICA AND NORTH-SOUTH ECONOMIC ISSUES. MALI WOULD PREFER TO SEE CHANGE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA BROUGHT ABOUT BY PEACEFUL MEANS BUT WOULD ACCEPT MILITARY ACTION IF CONVINCED THAT THAT WERE THE ONLY ROUTE LEFT OPEN. IN THAT

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SITUATION, MALI WOULD CONSIDER IT ENTIRELY NORMAL TO ALLOW THE SOVIET UNION AGAIN TO USE ITS AIRFIELDS AS STAGING AREAS TO THE SOUTH IF THE USSR SO REQUESTED.

12. IN THE BILATERAL CONTEXT, MALI STATEDLY WANTS GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, IN SPITE OF POLITICAL DIFFERENCES.

13. IN THIS SETTING, I BELIEVE WE MUST MAINTAIN A DEFINITE, RECOGNIZEABLE AMERICAN PRESENCE AS A KEY ELEMENT IN THE WESTERN INFLUENCE NEEDED AS BALANCE HERE AND WE MUST CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO AN IMPROVEMENT IN MALI'S WELL-BING. OUR TOOLS ARE DIPLOMATIC SUASION, FAR-REACHING DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS UNDERTAKEN BY AID AND THE PEACE CORPS, AND ENERGETIC USIS INFORMATION AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE ACTIVITY, TO WHICH MALIANS ARE RECEPTIVE. THE SAHEL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IS AN EXCELLENT VEHICLE TO ADVANCE OUR INTERESTS IN MALI, TO ASSIST IN ITS ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND TO PROMOTE REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION. IN ORDER FOR IT TO SUCCEES IN REORDERING THE SAHEL EVNIRONMENT, HOWEVER, IT MUST INCORPORATE AN INFRASTRUCTURE ELEMENT, NOW LACKING BECAUSE OF CONGRESSIONAL OPPOSITION.

14. MAINTENANCE OF THE AMERICAN PRESENCE AND PURSUIT OF OUR AID PROGRAMS WILL, I BELIEVE, MEAN CONTINUING GOOD THOUGH NOT CLOSE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MALI AND WILL HELP PREVENT THE DOMINANCE OF ANY SINGLE FOREIGN POWER OVER MALI'SPOLICIES. I WOULD ESTIMATE, HOWEVER, THAT ANY DEEPENDING OF THE RELATIONSHIP WOULD DEPEND UPON THE UNITED STATES' PERFORMANCE IN RESOLVING NORTH-SOUTH AND, ABOVE ALL, SOUTHERN AFRICAN ISSUES.

C. OBJECTIVES, COURSES OF ACTION, AND ISSUES

15. MAINTAIN A MEDIUM AMERICAN PROFILE THROUGH TRADITIONAL DIPLOMATICS PRACTICE AND THE VARIOUS MISSION PROGRAMS.
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16. CONTINUE THE EFFORT TO EXPLAIN U.S. POSITIONS ON KEY INTERNATIONAL ISSUES TO MALIAN OFFICIALS IN ORDER TO MAKE AMERICAN INTERESTS CLEAR. THERE IS A LINGERING MISPERCEPTION AMONG SOME -- BUT NOT ALL -- MALIAN OFFICIALS THAT MALI'S ACTIONS IN MULTILATERAL FORUMS HAVE NO BEARING ON ITS

BILATERAL RELATIONS, AND THEY MUST BE DISABUSED OF THE MISTAKEN IDEA. THE OBJECTIVE IS TO BRING MALI AROUND TO A MORE GENUINELY NEUTRAL STANCE, PARTICULARLY ON ISSUES OF KEY IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES AND OF MARGINAL OR NO INTEREST TO MALI, SUCH AS PUERTO RICO AND KOREA.

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17. IF EVIDENCE OF SUCH A MOVE TO A MORE NEUTRAL POSITION ON POLITICAL QUESTIONS BECOMES CLEAR, RESUME THE SMALL FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS) PROGRAM SUSPENDED IN 1975 BECAUSE OF UNFRIENDLY MALIAN ACTIONS IN THE UNITED NATIONS. DEFENSE MINISTER KISSIMA DOUKARA HAS TOLD ME MALI WOULD NOT ASK FOR ARMS AID FROM THE UNITED STATES. SHOULD THE FMS PROGRAM BE RESTORED, IT WOULD BE LIMITED TO THE PROVISION OF AN ENGLISH-LANGUAGE LABORATORY, MINOR SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT, AND POSSIBLY SOME TRAINING IN THE UNITED STATES. I RECOGNIZE THE ATTITUDINAL AND BUREAUCRATIC DIFFICULTIES SUCH A PROGRAM WOULD ENCOUNTER IN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES, BUT IF THE CIRCUMSTANCES BECOME RIGHT, I SHALL PRESS FOR THE CHANCE TO GAIN ACCESS TO THE MILITARY IN THIS MILITARY ENVIRONMENT WITH SUCH INSTRUMENTS AS AN AMERICAN LANGUAGE INSTRUCTOR.

18. KEEP MALIAN OFFICIALS INFORMED OF U.S. ACTIONS TO BRING ABOUT PEACEFUL CHANGE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND TO TRANSFER RESOURCES TO THE NON-INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS. THE FIVE-POWER DEMARCHE OF APRIL 7 TO SOUTH AFRICA ON NAMIBIA WAS AN EXCELLENT BEGINNING, THE MOMENTUM OF WHICH IT IS HOPED WILL CONTINUE. WAYS WILL HAVE TO BE FOUND TO CONVINCE THE "SOUTHERN" COUNTRIES, INCLUDING MALI, THAT OUR PROPOSALS FOR ECONOMIC TRANSFER MECHANISMS WILL BE FACT RESPOND TO THEIR

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NEEDS BETTER THAN THOSE THEY SUGGEST, WHICH WE CONSIDER INEFFICIENT.

19. SEEK TO ASCERTAIN WHAT THE SOVIETS AND CHINESE ARE UP TO AND TO ASSESS THEIR INFLUENCE.

20 BY THE MOST DISCREET AND INDIRECT WAYS, ENCOURAGE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLITICAL PARTY (THE UNION DEMOCRATIQUE DU PEUPLE MALIEN) NOW BEING FORMED AND THE EVENTUAL RETURN TO CIVILIAN RULE.

21. BE ALERT TO RARE OPPORTUNITIES TO INVITE THE ATTENTION OF MALIANS TO THE DELICATE SUBJECT OF CORRUPTION AND ITS DIVERSION OF ENERGIES AND FUNDS FROM THE PRIORITY GOALS OF DEVELOPMENT.

22. TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ANY OCCASION TO POINT OUT TACTFULLY THE INEFFICIENCIES OF MALI'S CURRENT SYSTEM OF STATE ENTERPRISES, SUBSIDIES TO AGRICULTURE, AND ARTIFICIALLY LOW CONSUMER PRICES, WHICH ARE ANOTHER INHIBITION TO GROWTH. THE SYSTEM IS UNLIKELY TO CHANGE BECAUSE IT IS PART OF THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL FABRIC OF THE NATION, BUT QUIET, PERSISTENT REMINDERS MAY BRING SOME IMPROVEMENT.

23. PROMOTE INVESTMENT AND TRADE OPPORTUNITIES FOR AMERICAN BUSINESS AND BANKING IN THIS SMALL MARKET.

24. UNDERTAKE AN ACTIVE USIS INFORMATION AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE PROGRAM AS A PRINCIPAL MEANS OF PUBLICIZING AMERICAN POLICIES AND AID ACTIVITIES AND OF FURTHERING UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNITED STATES.

25. PURSUE WITH VIGOR AND IMAGINATION THE VITAL SAHEL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, TAKING ACCOUNT OF MALIAN DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES AND ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY AND STRESSING AGRICULTURE, LIVESTOCK, AGRICULTURAL EDUCATION AND RESEARCH, RURAL
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HEALTH, AND THE GENERAL UPGRADING OF THE RURAL QUALITY OF LIFE.

26. IN THAT CONNECTION, USE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO PERSUADE RELEVANT ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESSIONAL OFFICIALS OF THE NEED OF SOME INFRASTRUCTURE AS AN INDISPENSABLE COMPONENT IN THE AMERICAN SEGMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT TO TRANS-

FORM THE SAHEL.

27. UTILIZE THE PEACE CORPS PROGRAM AS AN IMPORANT ADJUNCT TO DEVELOPMENT, CONTINUING THE TREND AWAY FROM ENGLISH-TEACHING IN THE CAPITAL TO DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITY IN THE COUNTRYSIDE.

28. USE THE EMBASSY'S SELF-HELP PROGRAM IN FIELDS NOT COVERED BY AID, INCLUDING SELECTED URBAN PROJECTS, AND AS SUPPORT TO PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEER EFFORTS.
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